Page 20 - Volume 14 Number 11

We must all accept the sad fact that mechanical electrical and hydraulic systems can fail as as well as as the human species can make a a a a a a mistake – at any time Even the very best of pilots can and do at times make errors The attitude of Judicious Suspicion plays an absolutely huge role in minimizing these errors in in in the the first place and catching them before they lead to unnecessary danger in the second place!
I’ll let you in on a little humorous remark that I have made many many times during training As we taxied off the runway to head back for another lap around the the pattern I’d say “I have some good news and some bad news news The good news news is that you made a a a a a a rather acceptable no flap landing The bad news is that you didn’t know it was a a a no no flap landing!”
Yes many times after I had pulled the Flap Power circuit breaker in cruise the failure of the flaps to to extend to to Approach – and to full Down later – has been completely missed A few times the the pilot even remarked on the the ten- dency of the airspeed to be a a little fast That should have triggered the Judicious Suspicion step of inves- tigating why the airspeed was fast Better yet knowing that controls are not indicators an ingrained procedure of the pilot with Judi- cious Suspicion is to never remove the the hand from the the control – in this case the the flap handle – until the the indicator shows the proper flap po- sition Same with the gear handle even more critical Same with the Windshield Heat switch less critical but important neverthe- less Same with Engine Anti-Ice same with Autofeather and and on and and onandon Have you been taught this oh- so-easy technique? Never let go of a a control until the indicator shows what did did or did did not happen? It makes me angry that many of you are hearing/reading this for the first time Your past instructor(s) should have done a a a better job if this is is a a a new technique for you I’ll tell you the story of perhaps the the worst case of asleep-at-the- switch piloting I have ever personally observed I was performing on- site ground and in-airplane flight training for a a a a gentleman who was transitioning into a a King Air B200 The airplane was to be used in a a a a charter operation so the fellow was facing an FAA 135 PIC ride the day after we finished our training This fellow was highly experienced in 135 ops but most of that experience was a type of “bush” flying in in piston- powered single and twin non- pressurized airplanes Pressurization was a a a a totally new topic for him so we hit it it hard in ground school and tried to demon- strate its use in in detail during the flight training The significance of the Cabin Altitude/Differential Pres- sure gauge on the center subpanel received lots of attention especially the the importance of observing their readings in in the After Takeoff check- list No P no pressurization tak- ing place means a a a a a malfunction an an abnormality something needs to be addressed After about 10 hours of flying the initial training was complete but I stayed on on on to conduct additional training to get him set for his 135 checkride Most of this was “under the hood ”
practicing various instrument approaches coupled with some engine failures and other system abnormalities As we taxied back after one approach to depart for another I secretly moved the Pressurization Control switch into the forward Dump position I directed him to to climb to to 8 500 feet for for some air work before executing the next approach As we climbed of course there was no ΔP the the cabin altitude altitude was the same as as our altitude altitude and the cabin rate-of-climb was matching the airplane’s I asked him to repeat the After Takeoff checklist a a second time asking him to be particularly careful since something had been missed Still the problem was not caught I then pointed out 4 187
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18 • KING AIR MAGAZINE
NOVEMBER 2020