There you are, just starting to roll from the “hold short” line onto the active runway to begin the takeoff for which you have just been cleared. Are you ready for takeoff?
“Of course I am, Tom! I’ve completed the proper checklists and given a briefing to myself since I am flying single pilot today. I am set to go!” Yes, of course you are “ready to commit aviation.” Enjoy a safe flight!
The rather “canned” briefing that most of us have learned quite well is almost always addressing an engine abnormality – failure, fire, other problem – and how we would react to that depending on the indicated airspeed. This is well and good and what is expected. Is it sufficient? In 95% of the cases, I think it is. The intent of this article is to jog your memory on some of the other abnormalities that can take place and to review some ideas of the optimal way of handling them.
At Takeoff
Window Opening: In the King Air, the only windows that open are the triangular-shaped “DV” (Direct Vision) windows located on each side of the cockpit just in front of the “D-shaped” window beside each pilot. The latch that secures these windows closed is usually quite easy to manipulate and rarely fails to operate properly. Hence, the possibility of a window opening in a King Air on the takeoff roll is remote. But if it does indeed happen? Don’t do anything in a rushed manner but as workload permits close and latch it properly. A little extra noise is the only difference this malfunction causes.
Do you realize that in flight, cabin air exits this opening but does not enter? The acceleration of the free airstream around the corner of the windshield creates an area of lower pressure outside of the cockpit in that location. Opening this window is listed in some POH’s as a way to help eliminate smoke after dumping the pressurization.
Have you ever tried to open the DV window in cruise while pressurized? Try all you want, but you won’t be able to do it. That triangular-shaped window is roughly 10 inches per side. If it were a square and not a triangle, it would equate to 100 square inches. Being that it is a triangle, it is about 50 square inches. Let’s see … 50 square inches at 5.0 psi differential pressure equates to 250 pounds of force holding that window closed! You’ll need to be at almost 0 psid before the gum rapper can be discarded through that opening!
Door Opening: Unlike the window, the cabin door going open in King Airs is, sadly, not uncommon at all. A strong pet peeve of mine is hearing, while seated in the cockpit, the cabin door being closed after the last passenger is loaded. Damn! Don’t close it that way! When you haul the door up far enough to grab the handle, turn it fully open, fully CCW (counterclockwise). This withdraws the latches and hooks into the door far enough so they cannot slam-bang against the fuselage door frame. Now gently pull the door in as far as it will go and then rotate the handle fully clockwise. See? Wasn’t that quiet and pleasant? Didn’t you prevent some wear and tear on the door and its frame? Now go ahead and do your normal six or eight checks to verify the door is completely and properly closed before walking forward.
(OK, here are the checks you should make: 1. Handle won’t rotate in the open CCW position since the button is not being depressed. 2., 3., 4. and 5. The green stripe can be viewed in the port above each latch bolt. 6. Lift the middle doorstep up against its spring and verify that the red arm is engaging the plunger properly as the little diagram there shows. Push the button to illuminate the inspection light so this is all easier to see. 7. and 8. Only for the 300-series, Beech also provides viewing ports and a light to inspect the two J-hook latches on top of the closed door. Now, finally, head for the cockpit and, later, confirm that no warning annunciator for the door is illuminated.)
Based on the number of King Air doors that have opened in flight, I believe these door checks and proper operation are very important indeed. The open doors have ranged from one that popped open on takeoff rotation – the airplane remained in the pattern, landed, inspected the door for any damage (none was found) closed the door properly, and continued on the flight – and many successive flights with no problems. At the other extreme, doors have opened in flight and totally departed the airplane, taking the door cable and hydraulic snubber with them. Perhaps the worst case of which I know involved a straight 100 model in which the door detached but the hand railing/cable remained attached. The left aft fuselage was beaten and dented very badly by the door flopping at the end of its cable before the plane landed successfully.
Brake Dragging: We hope a dragging brake would be caught before the takeoff roll began. It certainly could be difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate a dragging brake from some other steering problem. Definitely time to abort and correct the problem(s).
Blown Tire: Man, you’re really having a bad day, aren’t you?! Guess what? A single flat main tire on any King Air with dual mains will probably never be observed until the next preflight. “Where did that hole in the outboard’s tread come from?!” On the other hand, a 90-series model with a single main on each side … oh yeah, that will become immediately noticeable. Is there still room to easily abort? If so, that is of course the wise course of action. On the other hand, if available distance is “iffy” it might be better to continue to fly and head for an airport with a long and wide runway and with crash-equipment standing by.
Steering Failure, Loss of Normal Directional Control: As in most Beechcrafts, the King Air series can maneuver quite well on the ground with the nosewheel steering system totally disconnected. Differential braking combined with a free-swiveling nose wheel is quite manageable.
But what if the nose wheel is not free to swivel? This can be the result of the nose wheel steering shock link assembly no longer being “assembled.” In that case, the nose wheel may end up with a “neutral” position that is many degrees away from the proper, straight ahead position. As stated before, speed is the factor that will determine if this is an easily handled, early abort or if it’s going to be a hair-raising race to liftoff speed. The good news is that if the nose wheel steering worked normally on the way to the runway, chances are good that normal operation will continue during the takeoff roll.
Inoperative Airspeed Indicator (ASI): Ah, the old “Forgot the pitot tube cover again!” I certainly teach and advocate an early “airspeed alive” check no later than 60 KIAS. It’s easy to abort at that low speed if one side’s indicator is not working. On the other hand, if the opposite side is functioning normally then it depends on how much airspeed you have when the discrepancy is noted. I know of a case involving a King Air model 300 in California that went through an airport boundary fence, hit a car and badly hurt the driver, all because the pilot’s side ASI was blocked, yet the co-pilot’s indicator was functioning normally.
Collision with an Animal: As in so many of the situations we are discussing, the airspeed that exists when the abnormality occurs plays a huge factor. If unknown damage from the deer, elk or moose involves a wing or propeller it is probably prudent to abort even near “decision speed.”
Low Power: Heck, a PT6A-20-powered member of the 90-series, on a hot day in the mountains, less than full power is expected and does not fall into the abnormal/emergency category at all! But what about when conditions do not mandate reduced power, yet one engine is noticeably “weak?” An abort is the obvious and correct choice since the airspeed should be quite low when the discrepancy is observed.
This is why I teach – and it’s so very important! – that takeoff power application be a structured process and that takeoff torque be reached early, no later than 60 knots IAS. What is the “structured process?” For the majority of King Airs with the vertical stack of engine instruments, put your attention on the bottom of the stack first. Did a missing dipstick (Damn! I hate it when the phone rings while I’m checking the engine oil!) cause a lot of oil to be blown out? Unless oil temp and pressure are satisfactory, why even begin power application?
Next, bring your attention up to the propeller tachometers. To avoid unnecessary ITT spikes, advance the power levers quite slowly until you observe 1,500 RPM. If one side accelerates at a noticeably slower or faster rate than the other side – a very common occurrence – then split the power levers as necessary to match speeds. In almost all King Airs, once 1,500 RPM is attained, the engine response rate will be much faster and thereby lead to much lower ITT spikes. For newcomers, holding the brakes until you’ve matched power at 1,500 RPM is a great learning technique but will quickly become unnecessary on longer runways. In fact, achieving full power before brake release is the proper technique for all pilots when the runway is truly limited.
So now we are rolling with our attention still on the prop gauges that are now showing about 1,500 RPM. As fast as reasonably possible advance the power levers, splitting them as necessary to match propeller speeds, until you reach takeoff propeller speed. Does the RPM stabilize as it should? If so, you have just verified that the primary propeller governors are operating properly. If you see the unlikely situation of one side stabilizing about 4% above redline it’s time to abort since that side is being controlled now by its overspeed governor. Finally, now is the time to rapidly advance the power until the target takeoff torque – Minimum Takeoff Power – is reached. At lower-elevation airports on cooler days this will always be redline, maximum allowable torque. At higher elevations and hotter days, that’s when the minimum takeoff power chart should have been consulted to provide you with a target torque value. Not only is this the torque that the takeoff performance data has been based upon but, if you cannot achieve it because of an ITT restraint, you have an engine or indication problem.
Now some of you will find this next statement hard to believe, but here goes: Even adding power in the manner just described, takeoff torque should be set by no later than 60 KIAS. It’s easy with a little training and practice. If you are still having trouble adding power in this manner, then do what the charts say: Hold the brakes until takeoff power is attained.
Back to the title of this section “Low Power.” If one side has a problem in reaching the target power, it is very easy to abort the takeoff since airspeed is only about 60 knots or even less.
Crosswind Lack of Control: This is a weird one and quite unlikely. What does the POH say about a crosswind limitation? Nothing! Demonstrated crosswind component? Yes. Limitation? No!
So there you are, departing the gravel strip in the backcountry of Alaska where you picked up the boss and his friends from their weeklong hunting/fishing adventure. Dang! That wind sure is strong and about 90 degrees to the runway! Willing to risk it?
There’s no easy “correct” answer here. Use all of the crosswind techniques you know but if the airplane starts drifting to the downwind side of the runway even with all of the correct inputs, then I hope the runway is wide enough to allow you to stop before hitting something hard and fixed beside the runway. Wind usually dies down near sunset, right?
Runway Incursion: Dang! I can’t believe that 777 is crossing our runway! Can you safely stop well short of the airliner? Can you with 100% certainty clear the 777’s fuselage or tail if you continue? If neither of those options is a slam dunk, you’re probably better off aborting and steering around it, if possible. The kinetic energy needed to be dissipated in a collision at 30 knots is only about 11% of that needed to be dissipated at 90 knots.
Visibility Problem: You’ve just rolled into a dense fog bank sitting on the last half of the runway. It’s hard to see anything now, even the centerline stripe. Are you close to VR? Are you relatively comfortable with an IFR departure? If the answer to either of these questions is “No,” then staying on the runway and aborting the takeoff is likely the better choice.
Bird Strike: Was it a Condor or a Wren? Has any obvious airframe or propeller damage been inflicted? The answer to these questions will determine the best course of action.
After Liftoff
Now let’s discuss some possibilities after we have rotated and lifted off at the proper speeds.
Control Reversal: What the heck?! Why are we rolling left instead of right when I turned the wheel to pick up the left low engine side?! Folks, historically this leads to disaster and death. Please, please, please never conduct your before takeoff “Controls” check without truly verifying that all the control surfaces that you can see are moving correctly! Ailerons are easy to examine. Your thumb(s) point to the raised aileron, right? Did your primary flight instructor teach you this little trick? When you rotate the wheel to the left, CCW, the left aileron should go up to force the left wing down and vice versa on the right side. So your thumb(s) on the wheel should always end up pointing to a raised aileron.
Rudders and elevators? Nearly impossible to check unless you have an outside helper. However, on the conventional tail members of the 90-series you can actually observe the elevator move by looking through the last cabin window on the opposite side from which you are sitting.
Asymmetrical Engine Power: Is it an actual engine failure? How do you know? More importantly, why do you care? If you have rotated and are holding the normal +10-degree pitch attitude, if you’ve “stepped on the heading” and it’s taking some aggressive foot force to keep the heading bug under the HSI’s lubber line, and if your indicated airspeed is near V2, then try to relax. You’re performing well at this difficult time. Remember to move the landing gear handle to its “up” position then wait until reaching 400 feet AGL before continuing the Engine Failure checklist.
PPFGIVF – Power, Props, Flaps, Gear, Identify, Verify, Feather. I know you’ve had that mantra drilled into your memory bank more than once. When you checked the airspeed and it was near V2 and you weren’t requiring an inordinate amount of force to keep the heading bug centered, then it’s almost guaranteed that autofeather has done its job and the drag of a windmilling propeller has been automatically addressed and corrected.
But the dastardly deed of Power Lever Migration (PLM) won’t leave you with the situation we’ve described here. Since the retardation of either power lever turns off the autofeather system on both sides, we will be left with a windmilling propeller, lots of drag and the resultant lack of performance. Airspeed will rapidly deteriorate to something below V2 and climb rate will suffer immensely. We will rapidly be approaching the deadly VMC roll when controllability is lost.
By the way, realize that turning off autofeather when a power lever moves aft is not due to any engine power change. It’s because both left and right power levers have microswitches in the power quadrant that require both levers to be up near the 90% N1 position or above before the system can operate. The “autofeather test” switch’s purpose is to bypass these switches and permit the system to operate even when a power lever is retarded.
PLM is a killer! Check those friction knobs carefully as the checklist directs. A relatively new procedure I am now teaching and advocating is to quickly release the power levers after takeoff torque has been set and verify that neither side’s lever moves. Just a brief relaxing of the right-hand’s grip and lifting the hand’s palm maybe a half-inch or so is all we are talking about here. Did one or both of the levers start to migrate aft? If so, then two choices exist depending on how much runway remains. Choice One is to abort the takeoff roll, taxi back, tighten the friction more and then try again. Choice Two is to tighten the friction some more and continue. Having a co-pilot do the friction adjustment is really the only way this can be safely accomplished. Without a third hand to help it’s comical and perhaps deadly for just two hands to do what’s required while also completing the takeoff itself.
It will certainly be a painful, heart-wrenching decision to lower the nose to increase airspeed back up to V2 if the runway or the farm field is just a few feet below you. But friends, you and your passengers’ chance of surviving that “landing” is immensely greater than surviving the loss-of-control roll that you will face if you don’t push the wheel forward as speed drops well below V2.
If the retardation of one or both power levers due to PLM is observed by the pilot, it is of course easily corrected by pushing the misbehaving lever(s) back to where it/they should be. But when the movement goes unnoticed (Because it’s nighttime? Concentrating on the flight instruments? Distracted by a radio call?), that’s when disaster lurks nearby.
Retracting the gear on takeoff – especially when dealing with unexpected power asymmetry – is not nearly as critical as making sure both power levers are asking for takeoff power, that neither has slipped back. All parasite drag – whether a windmilling propeller, an antenna, flap panels, gear legs – depends on velocity through the air squared or multiplied by itself. The drag of the landing gear at 160 knots is four times as great as the drag at 80 knots (160 x 160 = 25,600, 80 x 80 = 6,400 and 6,400 x 4 = 25,600).
That’s a reason why our power loss mantra begins not with gear retraction but rather with checking power. Props comes next. Both prop levers are full forward, right? Next, flaps. If approach flaps were used on takeoff they should not be retracted until 400 feet AGL and VYSE are both attained and the correct, lower-than-blueline V2 airspeed should be maintained until leveling off at 400 feet. Next comes gear and now is the time to retract them. Now continue to “Identity, Verify and Feather” and for the myriad of you blessed with autofeather, it will be easy to identify and verify since the prop will already be stopped! But carefully go ahead and move the propeller lever into the feather detent yourself. That step guarantees that it won’t unfeather itself by accident later after the autofeather switch is turned off and also supports the habit pattern you will need to use when flying a multi-engine airplane that does not have autofeather.
Attempting the “Impossible Turn”: Turning back to land on the departure runway is a tempting option when the engine of a single-engine airplane quits on initial climb. Many times this attempt has ended in disaster and that’s why it goes by the name of the Impossible Turn. In a King Air, don’t even think about it. Get to pattern altitude, complete the checklist, decide where you want to land – it may not be at the departure airport but rather one with CFR (Crash, Fire, Rescue) capability – and proceed accordingly.
Controllability Issues: My close friend, Beechcraft factory instructor and demo pilot, David Yount, who instructed in King Airs and Dukes for my company Flight Review for many years (and who died much too early due to cancer), told of a winter departure from Beech Field in the factory’s model 200 demonstrator back in the 1970s. He found, on initial climbout that his pitch stability was almost non-existent. With much effort, he returned to the field and made a successful approach and landing. This taught all of us factory pilots how critical it is to verify that all snow and ice has been removed from the impossible-to-see top of the T-tail’s horizontal stabilizer and elevators. A tall ladder or a convenient balcony will be needed!
Here’s a question for you: The next time you conduct your “Before Takeoff” briefing, will you cover all of the abnormalities I have presented here? Golly, I hope not! You’re going to deplete your fuel supply taking the time to cover all of the possibilities!
Instead, I hope this article can serve to add more depth to your knowledge of what can and has occurred during the takeoff and departure process. Discuss it with the other pilot(s) with whom you fly. Maybe review it with the entire flight department during the monthly safety meeting (if you have one). Present it to your recurrent training instructor and see if he/she could perhaps incorporate a couple of these scenarios in a simulator session.
Most importantly, be reminded of some of the weird events that can happen and try to be prepared as best you can. Y’all be careful out there, ya hear?!